FROM THE PUBLISHER
Noah Feldman argues that to prevent nation building from turning into a
paternalistic, colonialist charade, we urgently need a new, humbler
approach. Nation builders should focus on providing security, without
arrogantly claiming any special expertise in how successful nation-states
should be made. Drawing on his personal experiences in Iraq as a
constitutional adviser, Feldman offers enduring insights into the power
dynamics between the American occupiers and the Iraqis, and tackles issues
such as Iraqi elections, the prospect of successful democratization, and the
way home.
Noah Feldman is also the author of:
After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy
FROM THE CRITICS
Robert Kagan - The New York Times
Scholars don't often get to test their theories in the field. Feldman did in
Iraq. As a constitutional adviser, Feldman helped shape Iraq's Transitional
Administrative Law, the interim constitution and political road map for the
country's transition from occupied territory to sovereign, democratic
nation. ''What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building'' is a
product of that experience. The book, like its author, is an unusual blend:
part theoretical treatise, part political analysis, part memoir. Above all,
it is a plea to the American conscience to take seriously the responsibility
the United States has assumed to help the Iraqi people build the democracy
Feldman believes they need and deserve.
Richard A. Clarke - The Washington Post
Noah Feldman, a law professor at New York University and a former senior
constitutional adviser to the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA),
provides a cogent analysis of U.S. efforts in Iraq in What We Owe Iraq.
Feldman details the behind-the-scenes power politics of the U.S. occupation
and delivers a persuasive appeal for a more grassroots approach to nation
building -- that is, an approach seen by most Iraqis as legitimized by local
input. He argues that nation-building can be an effective long-term strategy
to fight terrorism if its purpose is to create stable democracies. Feldman
surmises, correctly, that terrorism festers not only in weak states but also
in strong but undemocratic ones such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Publishers Weekly
Though there are books on the "how-to" of nation-building, there are none on
the ethical theories behind it, says Feldman, author of After Jihad: America
and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy and former senior constitutional
adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Feldman, who teaches
law at NYU, does not address the legality or wisdom of the removal of Saddam
Hussein's regime, nor the question of when international intervention is
justified. He includes some useful anecdotes from his Iraqi tenure, though
he doesn't aim to produce a comprehensive account of political negotiations
there. But his knowledge of the facts on the ground does lead him to
conclude that the U.S. needs to stay in Iraq for democracy to take; his
book, based on lectures delivered at Princeton in April 2004, constructs an
ethics for doing so. Considering trusteeship, he argues that the American
presence in Iraq should facilitate public speech, assembly and participation
in administration. He also warns Americans to abandon the notion that they
know how to produce a functioning democracy, something that has already come
to pass. Written with tempered passion and a grounded sense of the
possibilities, Feldman's book nicely bridges theory and practice, even as
some events outpace it. Agent, Heather Schroder of ICM. (Nov.) Copyright
2004 Reed Business Information.
Foreign Affairs
What are, and what should be, the legal and ethical norms governing the U.S.
role in Iraq? Feldman's answer, set within a crisp and provocative
examination of international law and historical experiences with
colonialism, trusteeships, and mandates, is that having broken the Iraqi
government, Washington has an obligation to bring about a new and better
one. The United States, with the United Nations and allies if and as
feasible, should assume the role of the "nonpaternalistic nation builder,"
whose primary responsibility is to "impose security... to prevent civil war
or anarchy" and then to organize elections to set the stage for eventual
withdrawal. Feldman weaves into his argument perceptive accounts of the U.S.
experience in Iraq (where he served as a legal adviser) in 2003 and 2004 and
wrestles with the kinds of observations the realist school of international
relations would raise. He notes in passing that the United States owes Iraq
a better job of nation building than the British provided after World War I.
At this point, however, many Americans and Iraqis might settle for one that
is merely no worse.